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Causation according to Mario Bunge
and Graham Harman
Martín Orensanz1
RÉSUMÉ — Imaginez une table de billard, sur laquelle se trouvent plusieurs boules
de billard rouges. Supposons que l’une d’entre elles en percute une autre. On pour-
rait prétendre que la première boule de billard, la cause, est en contact direct avec
la seconde, l’effet. Si nous devions généraliser cela pour toutes choses, pas seule-
ment pour les boules de billard, nous dirions que « la chose A cause la chose B ».
Comme nous le verrons, Bunge et Harman rejettent tous deux la conception pré-
cédente de la causalité. Ils s’entendent pour dire que l’affirmation « la chose A
cause la chose B » est fausse, parce que les choses n’entrent pas en contact causal
direct ; il doit y avoir un troisième élément qui les relie. Dans le cas de Bunge, deux
choses sont liées par des événements. Dans le cas d’Harman, deux objets réels sont
liés par un objet sensuel.
ABSTRACT — Imagine a billiard table, with several red billiard balls. Suppose that
one of them impacts another. It could be claimed that the first billiard ball, the
cause, makes direct contact with the second one, the effect. If we had to generalize
this for all things, not just billiard balls, we would say that "thing A causes thing B".
As we shall see, both Bunge and Harman reject the preceding view of causation.
They would agree that the statement "thing A causes thing B" is false. This is be-
cause things do not make direct causal contact with each other, there has to be a
third element that links them. In Bunge's case, two things are linked by events. In
Harman's case, two real objects are linked by a sensual object.
1 Martìn Orensanz is a Doctor en Filosofía from Argentina. His work focuses on three main topics: Argen-
tine philosophy, contemporary philosophy and philosophy of science. He has published a book, as well as
several articles in international journals. He won two scholarships (doctoral and post-doctoral) from the
National Scientific and Technical Research Council of Argentina (CONICET). Together with Guillermo
Denegri, he is working on the philosophical, historical and theoretical aspects of parasitology and hel-
minthology.
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1 CAUSATION ACCORDING TO BUNGE
Bunge wrote on causation throughout his career. The first systematic treatment
of this issue can be found in his book Causality: The Place of the Causal Principle
in Modern Science. He returned to this topic in subsequent works. His general
idea is that causation is a relation between events, not things. Thus, in Chasing
Reality, he says:
We start by making the usual if sometimes tacit assumption that the causal
relation obtains between events (changes of state in the course of time),
not between things or their properties. A simple classical example is
Hooke’s law: The strain or deformation of an elastic body is proportional to
the applied tension or load. Because only events can cause, we must disal-
low such expressions as “Gene G causes trait T ” and “Brain causes mind.”
We should say, instead, that the expression or activation of gene G causes
it to intervene in the biochemical reactions resulting eventually in the emer-
gence of phenotypic trait T. (Bunge, 2006: 90)
In other words, things-in-themselves do not causally relate to each other di-
rectly, they do so indirectly, by way of events. I believe that this point should be
emphasized, because it has often been overlooked by Bunge's readers, including
myself. In another article published in this volume, I argued that according to
Bunge, inorganic objects interact with each other as things-in-themselves. I re-
alize now that my claim about Bunge was wrong, since he claims that causation
is not a relation between things, but between their events. It was only through
my reading of Graham Harman's works that I gained a better understanding of
Mario Bunge's concept of causation. Given Harman's idea that causation is not a
direct relation between two real objects, since it requires a sensual object that
functions as a link, I had set out to compare that idea to Bunge's concept of cau-
sation. My question at that point was a simple one: would Bunge agree with
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Harman on this issue, or would he disagree? I had supposed that the latter was
the case, but I was surprised to find out that it was the former.
But what was more surprising was the fact that I had overlooked Bunge's en-
tire point about causation: that it is not a relation between things-in-themselves,
but between their events. Even though Bunge's point may sound trivial, since it
appears to be a simple technicality, that is not the case. What is at stake here is
no small matter, since his concept of causation provides the answer to the fol-
lowing crucial ontological question: in the absence of humans and other animals
endowed with nervous systems, do inorganic objects interact with each other as
things-in-themselves? The answer is no, they do not. They can only relate to each
other indirectly, through some kind of link, which, in turn, is not a thing-in-itself.
A change, according to Bunge, can be either an event or a process. He defines
an event as an instantaneous change of state, while a processes is a series of
events. For this reason, sometimes he speaks of causation as a relation between
events, as in the preceding quote, and at other times he is more precise, defining
causation as a relation between changes, which can be events or processes. The
following is an example of this:
To hold that “brain processes cause consciousness,” as Searle […] does, is
like maintaining that bodies cause motions, or that the gut causes digestion.
Things do not cause processes: they undergo processes; and these in turn
cause changes (events or processes) in other things. Shorter: the causal re-
lation holds only among changes (events and processes). (Bunge, 2006: 90-
91)
Bunge's critique of Searle and of other philosophers of mind consists in showing
that they do not have an adequate ontology. Causation, according to Bunge, is an
ontological concept, and it is difficult to develop an adequate account of it with-
out a general ontological framework. Thus, in Matter and Mind, he says:
Other philosophers of mind are not so much narrow-minded as confused
for lack of a broad and clear ontology. Thus John Searle (2007, 40 ff.), who
has published extensively on this subject, tells us that he opposes both ma-
terialism and psychoneural dualism. Yet he also claims that mental states
are caused by brain processes at the neuron level. States of one kind caused
by processes of another? This talk of upward causation sounds dualistic to
me. Moreover, it is reminiscent of the nineteenth-century vulgar material-
ist Karl Vogt, who famously claimed that “the brain secretes thought just as
the liver secretes bile.” There is an elementary ontological confusion here:
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By definition, processes are sequences of states, and only events are sup-
posed to cause events (more in Chapter 14). For instance, not LSD by itself,
but taking LSD, causes hallucinations. (Bunge, 2010: 144-145)
The example of LSD mentioned at the end of the preceding quote is noteworthy.
Clearly, the drug by itself, laying idly on a table, does not cause hallucinations. It
has to be taken by someone for that to occur. Likewise, it may be said that a glass
of water by itself does not quench thirst, drinking the water does that. A red bil-
liard ball laying idly on a billiard table does not cause another one to move, it
must undergo a change in order to do that. This being so, we can see why the
statement “thing A causes thing B” is false, since causation is not a direct relation
between things. Compare that statement to the definition of causation that
Bunge offers in Chasing Reality:
Definition 4.1 Event C in thing A causes event E in thing B if and only if the
occurrence of C generates an energy transfer from A to B resulting in the
occurrence of E. (Bunge, 2006: 90-91)
One could formulate a possible objection here: if there is an energy transfer from
A to B, as the preceding definition states, then there is a contradiction, because
that energy transfer is occurring between things (A and B), not between events
(C and E). My reply to that possible objection is that the energy transfer from A
to B can only occur by means of C and E, so there is no contradiction. Bunge offers
some additional clarification on this point:
The concept of energy may be used to define that of causation, and to dis-
tinguish the latter from correlation. Indeed, causation may be defined as
energy transfer, as in the cases of the light beam that burns a dry leaf or
activates a photocell. (In both cases the cause is light absorption, not light;
likewise, the effects are processes: combustion in the first case, and elec-
tron emission in the second. To generalize, the relata of causal relations are
events or processes.) (Bunge, 2010: 66)
If in doubt, consider the following example. Imagine that a thing “A” does not
undergo any changes, all of its energy remains within it. And imagine that a thing
“B” does not undergo any changes either, it does not receive any energy. How is
energy suppose to flow from thing “A” to thing “B” if they do not undergo any
changes at all? It can only be transferred from one thing to the other if these
things undergo changes. Thus, when thing “A” transfers energy and thing “B” ab-
sorbs it, both things have undergone changes, and it would be impossible for the
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energy transfer to occur directly, that is, from “A” to “B” without the changes “C”
and “E”.
2 CAUSATION ACCORDING TO HARMAN
We will now consider Harman’s view of causation. He addressed this problem at
length in Guerrilla Metaphysics, and he continued to refine this notion through-
out his subsequent works. Harman does not deny that real objects interact with
each other. What he denies is that they do so directly, since there has to be some-
thing that links them. Bunge would agree, since he says that causation is not a
relation between things, but between their events. Thus, in Object Oriented On-
tology: A New Theory of Everything, Harman says:
Since real objects exceed the grasp not only of all human theory, perception
and practical action, but of every sort of direct relation, then I wonder how
it is possible for one entity to influence another in any way. Obviously, I do
not question the existence of such influence, but only wonder about the
mechanism behind it. (Harman, 2018a: 150)
The mechanism in question, according to Harman, is that a sensual object func-
tions like a vicar or an intermediary for the causal relation involving two real
objects. Let us remember that, in Harman’s terms, real objects exist in them-
selves, not only independently of humans, but also independently of each other
as well. By contrast, sensual objects can only exist in relation to a real object.
Consider the example he offers of a red billiard ball that impacts a blue one:
We now have the basic OOO model of the cosmos: it is packed full of ob-
jects that withdraw from each other, incapable of direct contact. Here we
encounter another aspect of this philosophy that many critics find hard to
swallow. For is it not obviously the case that objects influence each other
all the time? Does science not calculate these interactions with extraordi-
nary precision, using the results to make badly needed medical devices and
launch probes deep into the solar system? OOO is aware of this, of course.
Its point is not that objects do not make contact, but that they cannot do
so directly. In an obvious-looking case such as two billiard balls colliding on
a table, the collision obviously occurs; we do not dispute this point. But as
seen from the OOO reading of Heidegger’s tool-analysis, the collision of
these balls is really a question of both balls interacting only with the most
superficial features of each other. When the red ball strikes the blue ball, it
is not striking the blue ball itself, but only a translated blue ball accessible
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to the red ball’s fairly impoverished world. By way of these impoverished
blue-ball-features, the red ball makes indirect contact with the blue ball it-
self, which also makes contact with its own blue-ball-features, though in a
different way. It is a question of indirect causation or, as OOO calls it, vicar-
ious causation. (Harman, 2018b: 127)
Thus, according to Harman, a real object can indeed interact with another real
object, but not directly, only by means of a sensual object. Causation, according
to him, is not only vicarious, but also buffered and asymmetrical. I cannot discuss
the details of these characteristics here because it would involve a more thor-
ough discussion of Harman’s philosophy in general, and it would be necessary
to examine other key concepts of his philosophy that I have not mentioned yet,
but that pertain to his view of causation, such as allure and black noise, among
others. I plan to address this issue in more detail in a future publication. For now,
it should be noted that one of the fundamental features of vicarious causation is
that it always creates a new object. Consider the example of two airplanes that
crash into each other:
When two fighter planes collide at an air show, we think that their impact
caused damage so severe as to lead to the crash and explosion of both. But
according to the model just sketched, this is merely a ‘retroactive effect on
its parts’ of a larger collision-entity, to which we never pay attention be-
cause it lasts so briefly and takes on little or no physical form. (Harman,
2010: 13-14)
If we analyze this example by distinguishing a series of phases, we may say the
following. Initially, both planes, “A” and “B”, exist separately from each other.
Then the crash occurs, what happens here is that plane “A”, as a real object, en-
counters a limited or sensual version of plane “B”, and in addition to this, the
encounter generates a new real object, “C”, which contains the real plane “A” and
the sensual plane “B”. This new object “C” is the collision itself, the “situation”, if
you will. It lasts for a brief moment, but it is still real. In the final stage, the colli-
sion as a new object interacts with the two real planes, but not directly, it does
so by way of a sensual version of plane “A” and a sensual version of plane “B”,
and through these intermediaries, it affects the real plane “A” and in the real
plane “B”.
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3 CONCLUDING REMARKS
Despite the fact that Bunge and Harman disagree on some specific issues regard-
ing causation, they agree on a more general and fundamental point: that it is not
a direct relation between things-in-themselves, since it requires the existence of
a link between those things, and that link is not a thing-in-itself.
What Bunge calls an “event” meets the criteria for being classified as a sen-
sual object, because he thinks that there are no events in-themselves. What he
means by this is not that events do not exist independently of human beings,
since he says that they do. Rather, he uses the term “in-itself” as a synonym of
“by-itself”. There are no events in-themselves because they cannot exist by
themselves, independently of things. Every event is a change of state of a thing.
In other words, there are no thingless events.
I encourage other readers of Bunge to take notice of the profound ontological
consequences that his concept of causation has. In general, when thinking about
the concept of the thing-in-itself, we tend to differentiate this notion from the
concept of phenomenon, surely due to the influence of Kant. This being so, we
take it for granted that before the emergence of the first animals endowed with
nervous systems, “there was no appearance, there was only reality”, as Bunge
(983: 150-151) says. But this does not automatically mean that, before the emer-
gence of those animals, things-in-themselves were causally relating to each
other directly, since they were doing so indirectly, by way of events.
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